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Kuwait’s Political Impasse and Rent-Seeking Behaviour: 
A Call for Institutional Reform 
FAHAD AL-ZUMAI 
Abstract 
This paper introduces an analysis of the impact of rent-seeking on Kuwait’s historical 
political impasse and the stagnation of its democratic institutional development. The 
main questions that the paper aims to answer are how rent-seeking is influencing the 
development of Kuwait’s political system and whether it is possible to minimize the 
spread of rent-seeking in the Kuwaiti polity. The paper evaluates the ‘institutional 
settings’ of the Kuwaiti polity by applying rent-seeking theory, and concludes that a 
constitutional reform introducing a stakeholder-based definition of ownership of natural 
resources is a fundamental safeguard to protect the interests of future generations and to 
minimize the spread of rent-seeking. Finally, the paper advocates reforming available 
safeguards in the Kuwaiti polity such as the Constitutional Court, the introduction of 
political parties and, finally, empowering civil society as additional means to reduce the 
spread of rent-seeking. 
Keywords 
Kuwaiti politics; National Assembly; political reform and stagnation; rentier state 
theory; rent-seeking 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with Kuwait’s current political paralysis and the stagnation of its democratic 
institutional development. In order to do so, the paper evaluates the ‘institutional settings’ of 
the Kuwaiti polity by specifically assessing the impact of rent-seeking on its evolution. The 
paper therefore examines the spread of rent-seeking behaviour as a factor that is eroding the 
existing political institutions and is affecting their development.
1
 Rent-seeking behaviour is 
exacerbated by the fact that Kuwait is a ‘rentier state’. Rentier states derive most of the 
revenue that they generate from the rent of their natural resources (Al-Zumai 2007: 16–18). 
A rentier state is generally seen in political theory as a state short of certain key factors 
and reasons to develop a democratic political system and institutions (Al-Khouri 2009).
2
 
Although rentier state theory has evolved since the 1970s, the basic tenets of its original 
                                                          
1
 The paper adopts Douglass North’s definition of institutions as ‘the humanly devised constraints on repeated 
human interaction, that is, the rules of the game – both formal and informal norms of behavior and the way they 
are enforced’ (North 1988: 15). 
2
 Many studies have argued that rentierism affects democracy negatively (Anderson 1987; Crystal 1995; Luciani 
1990; Herb 1999; Lowi 2009).  
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political findings are still valid.
3
 Rentier states tend to overlook local demands for reform 
because of the political autonomy they derive from the external rents they receive (Brumberg 
and Ahram 2007: 5). It is often said that in effect, therefore, states with natural resources, and 
oil in particular, tend to be cursed with the ‘paradox of plenty’, which entails corruption, 
authoritarianism and economic decline (Basedau and Lacher 2006: 5). All of this results in 
what is known as the ‘rentier special contract’, according to Wiktorowicz (1999: 608). 
Indeed, Kuwait obtains a substantial portion of its national revenue from the rent of its 
oil reserves. In the proposed budget for the years 2010–11, the total estimated revenue was 
KWD9.72 billion; around 82 per cent of this revenue was generated from oil exports (Al-Shall 
2010a). While at first glance the political system of Kuwait seems to defy the typical 
descriptions of rentier states, it is deeply affected by rent-seeking attitudes.
4
 Two features 
illustrate this point. First, it has been contended that the level of political freedom in Kuwait is 
higher than that of its Arab neighbours: the Press Freedom Index of 2011 classified Kuwait as 
one of the four Arab countries that were partly free.
5
 However, more recent reports from 
Freedom House indicate that freedom of the press in Kuwait is declining as a result of all the 
legal actions directed towards a number of activists (Amnesty 2013). 
The second feature relates to the division of powers in Kuwait. Kuwait’s parliament, 
the National Assembly, plays an active and substantive role in governance, both in legislating 
and in monitoring the government. The contribution of the National Assembly of Kuwait is 
particularly strong in comparison to other emirates or regional constitutional monarchies, such 
as Jordan.
6
 Arguably, the institutional framework that was introduced by the 1962 Kuwaiti 
Constitution, regardless of its shortcomings, has partially saved the country from the ‘paradox 
of plenty’ by introducing checks and balances on political power and corruption.7 This can be 
                                                          
3
 For more discussions on the evolution of rentier state theory, see Gray (2011).  
4
 See Luciani (1990). In addition, a number of scholars have extended the remit of the classical rentier state 
theory to offer a theoretical foundation for the current status of rentier states and in particular Gulf States (Gray 
2010). 
5
 Seehttp://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW_2011_Booklet.pdf. For a critique of the Freedom House 
methodology, especially in considering Middle Eastern countries, see Harik (2006). 
6
 For more details on the electoral environment in Jordan, see Lust-Okar (2009).  
7
 Some studies link democratic governance with the avoidance of the resources curse; see e.g. Alexander and 
Gilbert (2010: 10). The so-called economic success stories in the region, such as Dubai, have validated the 
authoritarian model of government in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). People in Kuwait were so impressed 
by Dubai’s economic success and its apparent connection to Dubai’s authoritarian model of government that they 
began to ask whether the democratic system of Kuwait, adopted with the 1962 Constitution, was an obstacle to 
attaining the economic success that Dubai had achieved. The daily newspaper Alseyassah openly advocates 
following Dubai’s direction. Also, it is irrational to expect the reforms proposed in this paper to lead Kuwait to a 
‘political utopia’. Arrow’s impossibility theorem has proved that there is no perfect system of voting and that it is 
3 
 
demonstrated by comparing the recording of oil and gas revenues in Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries. According to a study conducted by Dr Al-Kuwari, oil and gas revenues, 
especially if they are substantial amounts, are not recorded properly as a state revenue in the 
GCC. Table 1 illustrates this and shows that Kuwait is a true exception to the phenomenon in 
the GCC. It can be argued that this is due to the institutional settings introduced by the 
Constitution (Al-Kuwari 2009: 82). The positive surplus in the case of Kuwait is due to local 
consumption and sales. 
On the other hand, especially in the last few years, Kuwait has experienced a notable 
political impasse. For example, over the period 2006–12, eleven governments were formed, 
and five National Assemblies were constitutionally dissolved.
8
 The year 2006 represented a 
milestone in the history of Kuwait’s polity as the National Assembly voted to remove the 
ailing Amir Sheikh Sa’ed Al-Abdulah Al-Sabah and appoint Amir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad 
Al-Sabah. This event empowered the parliament in an indirect way, and subsequent events 
such as the interpellation of the prime minister show the evolution of the polity in Kuwait. 
Rent-seeking is becoming a contest to tilt the balance of power between the parliament and the 
ruling family. 
 Scholars have attributed this political impasse to a number of reasons. Al-Najjar, for 
instance, links it to structural challenges in the Kuwaiti polity, such as the non-partisan nature  
Table 1. Difference between oil and gas production revenue and recorded public budget 
revenue, 2007 (US$ billion) 
 Saudi Arabia United Arab 
Emirates 
Kuwait Qatar 
Total value of oil and gas 
revenue 
206.4   84.4   60.1   40.7 
Public budget recorded 
revenue from oil and gas 
149.9   69.8   65.2   20.2 
Difference    56.5   14.6   (5.1)   20.5 
% 27.4% 17.30% (8.5%) 50.4% 
Source: Al-Kuwari (2009).  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
unrealistic to expect rational and egalitarian social decisions in every political setting. For more discussion on 
this topic, see Parisi (1998: 746). 
8
 See Herb’s (2013) database on Kuwaiti politics. Two governments were formed in 2006. The same thing took 
place in 2007. In 2008 there was only one government change, and since 2009 each year the country has had two 
governments introduced, with the exception of 2010. The changes tend to vary from minor amendments to the 
government’s composition to a major reform.  
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of the parliament, and to political challenges, such as an imbalance in power (Al-Najjar 2000). 
It has also been argued by Power (2012) that weak parliamentary performance in Kuwait, and 
in Bahrain and Oman, can be traced to the weakness and underdevelopment of political parties 
in these countries. In addition, the failure to liberalize the economy in these countries is 
hindering the development of their parliaments (Power 2012: 43–4). Others, such as Herb, 
believe that the failure of the opposition to act in unity and press for a reform agenda is one of 
the main reasons why the Kuwaiti parliament is not pushing for more power. This is also 
associated with the hesitation of the Kuwaiti voter to transit to a full democracy (Herb 2009: 
138). According to Herb, ‘there is no reason to think that oil, in itself, explains the absence of 
democracy in Kuwait’ (ibid.). 
The literature on rent-seeking and democracy is well established, and historical 
findings suggest that democracies tend to reduce rent-seeking behaviour and contribute 
positively to the quality of a nation’s institutions (Calderon and Chong 2005: 5). Kuwait, as 
will be illustrated in this paper, seems to indicate the opposite to conventional theory when it 
comes to rent-seeking and democracy, as its democratic institutions, mainly the National 
Assembly, appear to tend to encourage and support rent-seeking behaviour. 
This paper aims to provide an analysis of the impact of rent-seeking on Kuwait’s 
continuing political dilemmas and of the structural obstacles facing any political reform 
agenda. The paper will formulate recommendations on how to minimize the negative effects 
of rent-seeking behaviour, which is one of the main obstacles to the evolution of Kuwait’s 
political system. That is, the paper will advance the idea that in order to limit the spread of this 
behaviour, a constitutional amendment to the concept of ‘public ownership’ of natural 
resources should be implemented. The proposed amendment introduces a stakeholder-based 
property regime for natural resources to limit the rent-seeking behaviour which is eroding 
Kuwait’s democratic institutions. In particular, it is maintained that the fiduciary duty of the 
political bodies under the Kuwaiti Constitution should be extended to include sustainability 
and the interests of future generations, especially when it comes to the expropriation of natural 
resources, with special attention to the role of the Constitutional Court. 
In fact, it will be shown that the current Kuwaiti legal framework concerning natural 
resources facilitates rent-seeking behaviour, as it reduces the costs of engaging in such 
behaviour substantially. The problem with the current legal definition of public property, and 
in particular of natural resources, is that it does not create a standing from which to challenge 
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any law or actions by the government on the basis that such a law or decision will have a long-
term negative impact on future generations. 
This paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, an historical overview is 
provided of developments in and setbacks to the Kuwaiti political environment since 
independence. The subsequent section presents the problem of rent-seeking behaviour and 
interest groups endemic in the Kuwaiti polity. Next, the paper analyses in depth the relation 
between constitutional design and rent-seeking behaviour. Special attention is paid to 
identifying the political forces that influenced the writing of the Kuwaiti Constitution, as well 
as to evaluating the current status of constitutional backup safeguards in Kuwait. Finally, the 
paper proposes suggestions for constitutional reform to tackle the problems of rent-seeking in 
Kuwait politics. 
2. OVERVIEW OF KUWAIT’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: DEVELOPMENTS AND SETBACKS 
This section aims to identify the historical background of the evolution of Kuwait’s 
democratic institutions. Since its independence from the British Empire, which ended its 
protectorate relations in 1961, Kuwait has undergone a series of positive developments that 
contributed to the evolution of the political system and increased the scale of freedom, 
accountability and transparency. In 1962 a new Kuwaiti Constitution was created, which 
established a constitutional hereditary emirate and entrenched the division of powers in the 
country.
9
 More recent developments include, for example, the granting of political rights for 
women in 2005;
10
 the separation of the posts of crown prince and prime minister in 2003 
(Democracy Reporting International and Kuwait Transparency Society 2008); the 
interpellation of the prime minister in 2009, 2010 and 2011 on corruption-related matters – a 
historical precedent which empowered the parliament (Kuwait National Assembly 2011: 56); 
the election of four female MPs to the parliament in 2009 (MEI 2009: 4–5); the liberalization 
of the media and press (Kuwaiti Law No. 3/2006); and other events that continue to contribute 
to the evolution and maturation of the Kuwaiti political system. 
Countering this progress, Kuwait has witnessed a number of major setbacks during its 
short modern political history. The two main setbacks were the unconstitutional dissolutions 
of the National Assembly from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1992 (Kuwait National 
Assembly 2011: 56). The amir issued a decree in 1976 to dissolve the National Assembly, in 
violation of the Constitution – in essence, a coup. This created an implicit menace to the 
                                                          
9
 The amir still appoints the head of the executive branch. See Article 56 of the Kuwaiti Constitution. 
10
 For more details on Kuwaiti women’s political rights, see Al-Mughni (2010). 
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National Assembly and activists.
11
 The negative impact of these two incidents continues, as 
the possibility of an unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly still exists and 
threatens the Constitution and social contract of the state.
12
 
The diversion of some of the political institutions from their constitutional functions, 
such as the National Assembly, also became a phenomenon in Kuwait, especially with the 
emergence of ‘services MPs’.13 The political systems of other countries in the region, which 
have similarities to Kuwait, are instructive. Let us take the example of Jordan. According to 
Lust-Okar (2009), the parliamentary election in Jordan’s political system serves to reinforce 
wasta (favouritism).
14
 In Kuwait, elections serve a similar purpose; however, for Kuwaiti 
voters, the chief purpose of elections is to support rent-seeking. The absence of full support for 
the rule of law has led to the importance of wasta as the sole mechanism to get what 
individuals desire.
15
 This eventually altered the National Assembly’s function and extended it 
to become a ‘service-oriented institution’, contrary to its constitutional functions and in clear 
violation of the Kuwaiti Constitution’s principle of separation of powers. 
The ongoing impasse in the relationship between the two main branches, namely the 
executive and the legislative, is becoming the theme of Kuwaiti political discussion. The 
Kuwaiti parliament has shown its strength over time and continues to clash with and confront 
the executive branch. Since 2004 the amir has dissolved parliament three times.
16
 In addition, 
six governments have stepped down, and nine were formed in 2006–9 as a result of 
parliamentary confrontation (Shayji 2009). Since the introduction of the Kuwaiti Constitution, 
the parliament has interpellated more than forty ministers, including the prime minister, who 
comes from the royal family (ibid.). These interpellations were all related to cases of 
corruption, nepotism and failure to adhere to the rule of law.
17
 
To date, a true and honest assessment of the root causes of this impasse has been 
absent from public discussions. Nonetheless, there has been a recent movement to aim at more 
institutional redesign to avoid the current impasse. A number of commentators and politicians 
                                                          
11
 It became common knowledge that whenever the relationship between the parliament and the government 
became tense, the threat of an unconstitutional dissolution would be circulated in the media and among activists.  
12
 The role of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Court in the self-enforcement of the constitution is examined below in 
section 4.  
13
 For more details, see Power (2012). 
14
 For more analysis of the concept of wasta, see Faisal (1990). 
15
 For more details on the involvement of MPs in offering services wasta to voters, see Al-Zumai (2007).  
16
 When the amir dissolves parliament, the Constitution requires that a new election be held within two months of 
the dissolution. Civil society, labour unions and professional associations organized an opposition coalition 
against the unconstitutional decisions to dissolve parliament in the 1970s and 1980s. See Lawson (1985). 
17
 For more details on the history of these interpellations see Al-Saidi (2009). 
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have raised a variety of solutions, such as constitutional reform designed to reduce the powers 
of the National Assembly,
18
 or the removal from office of certain individuals, such as the then 
prime minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Sabah, claimed to be a major contributor to 
the cause of the current impasse.
19
 The level of government penetration of the National 
Assembly led a number of MPs to urge the amir to dissolve it constitutionally and call for 
elections, as they argued that the National Assembly had been hijacked by the government.
20
 
Time has shown that this analysis is not entirely accurate, as despite Sheikh Nasser Al-
Mohammed Al-Sabah’s 2011 resignation, political impasse continues to be the case. 
Corruption cases related to suspicious payment to a number of MPs in the 2009 
parliament were submitted to the public prosecutor’s office. This case shocked Kuwaiti 
society, as it revealed the extent and magnitude of corruption claims. More worrying is the 
claim that the payment was institutionally orchestrated by the prime minister. The result was 
an unprecedented youth-led protest which lasted for months, demanding the dissolution of 
parliament and the removal of the prime minister. These efforts eventually led the amir to 
dissolve the Cabinet and call for early elections (Kinninmont 2012: 2). Other researchers have 
suggested that Kuwait is witnessing a political decay that is rooted in its social structure – in 
particular, in the emergence of tribes as an active player on the scene. Arguably these groups 
are the true impediment to social progress in Kuwait (Al-Fadalah 2011). 
The absence of political parties in Kuwait has created a government that is in a 
‘privileged’ position in terms of the associated transaction costs in the legislative process, as it 
requires less than one third of the National Assembly to pass any piece of legislation, and only 
a slightly larger number to block any bill.
21
 This dominant position has been brought about by 
two factors. First, the government acts as one voting bloc; in accordance with the Constitution, 
according to Article 128 (Abdulmalek 2003: 246),
22
 Cabinets need contain only one elected 
                                                          
18
 For more details on these suggestions, see MP Ali Al-Rashed’s proposed amendments to the Kuwaiti 
Constitution in 2010, http://www.alraimedia.com/Alrai/Article.aspx?id=198526.  
19
 Mohammed Abdulqader Al-Jasem, an activist, launched a number of studies and articles aimed at exposing the 
prime minister. These activities resulted in the activist’s prosecution. Moreover, a number of social groups were 
formed that aimed at the removal of the prime minister. One example is the ‘Leave, we deserve better’ 
movement. 
20
 Five MPs in 2010 pleaded with the amir to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections. See 
http://www.alsabahpress.com/spress/Default.aspx. 
21
 For more details on transaction costs, see Coase (1960). 
22
 Article 128 of the Kuwaiti Constitution is as follows: ‘Deliberations of the Council of Ministers are secret. 
Resolutions are passed only when the majority of its members are present and with the approval of the majority 
of those present. In case of an equal division of votes, that side prevails on which the prime minister has voted. 
Unless they resign, the minority has to abide by the opinion of the majority. Resolutions of the Council of 
Ministers are submitted to the amir for approval in cases where the issue of a decree is required.’ 
8 
 
MP and the remaining ministers become ex officio MPs. Hence the transaction costs of 
making any decision in the legislative process in terms of liaising, bargaining costs and the 
dissemination of information are minimal if the government utilizes its position – the 
government enjoys an inbuilt organizational advantage compared with other political players 
in the game. 
The failure to acknowledge political parties legally produces a decision-making process 
that is inefficient from an economic perspective. In contrast, in multi-party parliaments 
negotiations are conducted in such a way that internal political party approval and 
deliberations increase the cost of bargaining. Additionally, competition among MPs to support 
the government is a well-established market in the National Assembly. In economic terms, 
there is a semi-efficient market for a government coalition in the National Assembly, as the 
available options of allies for the government are much greater than if there were two or more 
political parties, which would serve to limit the available choices for the government. That is, 
the bargaining power of these parties would be greater than in the current situation; the 
absence of officially recognized political parties makes it easier from an economic perspective 
for the government to control and dominate the National Assembly, and undermines the 
effectiveness of the Assembly as an institution. On the other hand, the lack of political parties 
fosters the characterization of politics as the field of competing, particular, rent-seeking 
interests. 
3. RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR AND INTEREST GROUPS ENDEMIC IN THE KUWAITI POLITY 
This paper argues that rent-seeking is undermining the development of Kuwait’s political 
institutions. This is exacerbated by the fact that Kuwait is a rentier state. Rentier states tend to 
develop a socio-economic-political system that rewards and encourages rent-seeking (Losman 
2010: 443). This section explores the impact of rent-seeking on Kuwaiti political rules and the 
development of democratic institutions in an environment where politicians continuously 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour. Rent-seeking is ‘a term used by economists to describe 
actions taken by individuals and groups to alter public policy in order to gain personal 
advantage at the expense of others’ (Van den Hauwe 1999: 615). As a consequence, rent-
seeking is ‘designed to describe behaviour in institutional settings where individual efforts to 
maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus’ (Brooks and Heijdra 1988: 
4). Thus, the process of expending resources in an attempt to influence public policy outcomes 
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is called rent-seeking. The resources spent create no social product and, as a result, are 
regarded as social waste. 
The spread of rent-seeking behaviours is having an impact on the social norms of 
society as, according to Ikeda, 
rent-seeking tends over time to encourage growing numbers of ordinary people to engage in 
it, trying to acquire political power either to gain advantages over the less powerful or as 
redress against the mounting advantages and political power of others. It thereby sets into 
motion a troubling dynamic that over time progressively erodes respect for the rule of law, 
limited government, and private property. (Ikeda 2003: 26) 
 This is exactly what is happening in Kuwait as rent-seeking is becoming the norm, and the 
notions of public interest and rule of law have eroded in society since the early 1980s.
23
 For 
instance, public sector salaries and subsidies increased by 540 per cent from 2001 to 2011 (Al-
Qabas 2011). This is also reflected in various studies conducted by the International Monetary 
Fund in relation to Kuwait’s budget (Figure 1). 
 This rent-seeking trend can also be found in other Arab countries. For example, Lust-
Okar maintains that in Jordan ‘MPs can also call upon ministers and bureaucrats to allocate 
jobs to constituents, at times threatening state institutions or scandalizing them in parliament if 
they did not react positively to their requests’ (Lust-Okar 2009: 10). The same practices are 
witnessed in the Kuwaiti parliament as MPs continue to rely heavily on advocating ‘popular 
laws’ in order to ensure re-election.24 Figure 2 shows that the number of popular bills 
introduced by MPs in the thirteenth term (2009–12) amounted to 39 per cent of the total 
                                                          
23
 Government public expenditure has increased sharply since the early 2000s. For instance, total government 
subsidies jumped from KWD817 m in 2005 to KWD3,372 m in 2010. Wages and salaries jumped from 
KWD2,125 m in 2005 to KWD4,047 m in 2010. For more details see IMF (2011). A number of arguments have 
been presented to explain the continuous decline of the functioning of the parliament. These include the impact of 
a new electoral law that was implemented in 1980 by an amiri decree introducing twenty-five districts instead of 
the existing ten. Some believe that this had a negative impact on the performance of parliament. In addition, the 
naturalization of Bedouin in the 1970s to act as a government voting bloc is associated with the decline of the 
role of parliament in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the government support of Islamists is also presented as an 
argument to explain the decline since the 1980s.  
24
 Recently the minister of health was verbally abused by an MP for simply refusing to process a request for a 
wasta and was on the verge of physical assault. It is also interesting to see that during the drafting of the 
constitution, the legal expert appointed by the Council, Dr Othman Khalil Othman, raised the issue of wasta 
when Article 115 was being discussed, as this Article stipulates that ‘(1) The Assembly sets up, among its annual 
standing committees, a special committee to deal with petitions and complaints submitted to the Assembly by 
citizens. The committee seeks explanation thereon from the competent authorities and informs the person 
concerned of the result. (2) A member of the National Assembly may not interfere with the work of either the 
Judicial or the Executive Power.’ Dr Othman gave as an example that he would not expect the MPs to discuss 
these matters by going to the ministers’ offices, in order to ensure the purity of the relationship and avoid any 
influence that the government might exercise on the MPs. This is a good example of a case where the reality is 
the opposite of what the founders of the Constitution anticipated.  
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Figure 1. Wage bill growth rate, 2000/1–2011/12 (percent) 
  
Source: Country authorities and IMF staff estimates. 
 
Figure 2. Bills proposed by MPs in the thirteenth term (percent) 
 
 
bills proposed by MPs. This indicates the extent of rent-seeking behaviour in the parliament, 
as such behaviour is the traditional mechanism for the great majority of MPs to ensure re-
11 
 
election and hence avoid the need to advance structural reforms to the political system in 
Kuwait. This is also reflected in a survey conducted by the National Assembly statistical 
office regarding citizens’ priorities in relation to expected legislative action: in the top five 
were the expectation that parliament would pass a law that compels the government to assume 
consumers’ debt and increase salaries (Kuwait National Assembly 2012: 16). 
Rent-seeking behaviour is not limited to the government; rather, it is endemic in the 
Kuwaiti polity. A good example is a law passed in 2009 by the National Assembly with a 
majority of thirty-five out of fifty-eight votes. This law mandates the dropping of interest 
payments on all consumer loans and mandates that the state will instead pay the interest on 
behalf of the citizens.
25
 According to Al-Shall (2011), it is estimated that the cost of this law 
would be in the area of KWD1.5 billion. The demand for such a law was the theme of the 
election campaign of one of the MPs, Dr Thaif Allah Bo Ramia.
26
 His absurd proposal and 
campaign initiated a new era of wealth distribution and rent-seeking behaviour in the Kuwaiti 
polity. Another example was the January 2011 announcement by the amir that each Kuwaiti 
should received approximately US$3,350 as a gift, at a total cost of around US$5 billion (Al-
Shall 2011). Liberal economists such as Hayek and Buchanan argue against state intervention 
to impose equalizing policies as they contend that such state policies diminish the concept of 
risk and kill incentives to work and invest. This is the case in Kuwait, as the distributional 
efforts of the legislature, government policies and the encouragement of rent-seeking 
behaviour are leading to moral hazard, and resulting in a competition between the government 
and the National Assembly to engage in rent-seeking and wealth distribution as part of a 
power struggle. 
Interest groups, that is, ‘any group between the individual and the state that seeks to 
influence public policy for its private gain’ (Farber & O’Connell 2010: 262), play a major role 
in promoting rent-seeking behaviour in a rentier economy. Indeed, public choice theory states 
that ‘groups that can organize for less than a dollar in order to obtain one dollar of benefits 
from legislation will be effective demanders of laws’ (Mueller 1996: 521).27 Interest groups 
are very active in Kuwait, especially when it comes to merchants, labour unions and social 
                                                          
25
 This is an extreme example but a good illustration of the extent of ‘public rent-seeking’ in Kuwait. Fortunately 
the law was rejected by the amir but the National Assembly has a chance of passing it again in the next 
legislative term and overriding the amir’s veto. For more details on this proposal see Al-Shall (2009a).  
26
 Dr Thaif Allah Bo Ramia is a medical doctor, so any claim that he was not properly educated is not valid: he 
understood the implications of his proposal, for which he fought for more than four years.  
27
 For a general introduction to public choice theory, see Shughart (2007). 
12 
 
networks.
28
 In Kuwait, the majority of the population became an interest group and started to 
dip into future generations’ welfare by exhausting current resources. This trend is of particular 
concern in a rentier state like Kuwait where the main source of revenue for the state is not the 
result of real economic activities that are taxed, but oil. 
Some structural design to protect the interests of future generations was implemented 
in the 1970s as Law No. 106/1976, establishing a future generation fund in case oil depletes. 
This is funded by a deduction of no less than 10 per cent of total oil revenue per annum. The 
government decided in the 2012 budget to increase the deduction from 10 per cent to 25 per 
cent for that particular fiscal year only (Al-Shall 2012). It is hoped that such a percentage 
becomes permanent in order to strengthen this fund. According to local newspapers the value 
of the fund investment as of 2012 was estimated to be around US$262 billion. This fund 
ensures an acceptable cushion for future generations, although prior practices in Kuwait 
undermine this severely. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s the government used to dip into 
this fund to cover its deficit in the form of loans, making it in reality a saving account for the 
government rather than for future generations (Al-Shall 2012).
29
 
According to Tollison, ‘those who “supply” wealth transfers are individuals who do 
not find it cost effective to resist having their wealth taken away’ (Tollison 1988: 343). 
However, in Kuwait, those whose wealth is being stripped away are the future generations of 
Kuwaitis and not the ‘tax payers’. Because future generations are voiceless, a state of apathy 
regarding them is created. In fact, such apathy is shifting towards the demand side, as wealth 
distribution is becoming the norm and demands are emerging from all sectors of society to 
exploit future generations’ share of resources for the benefit of the current generation. In 
effect, a new institution has been introduced into the Kuwaiti polity: wealth redistribution. To 
escape this rentier state flaw, a new legal definition of the notion of public ownership of 
natural resources is needed. A new definition of public ownership that can reduce the current 
rent-seeking behaviour and help the nation escape the rentier state dilemma will be introduced 
below. 
One of the consequences of being a rentier economy, according to Karl, is that ‘instead 
of a capitalist class, nouveau riche – fabulously and ostentatiously rich and dependent – 
characterize oil states. But because this wealth is the result of a windfall as well as privileged 
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 One reason behind their activism is the fact that the government cannot dissolve such a union without a court 
order. Recent strikes by a number of public sector agencies have shown how powerful they are, as the 
government accepted all of their demands. 
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 For more details, see the newspaper Al-Qabas, http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/112574. 
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links to the state, and because it may be largely independent of merit-based efforts made by 
citizens, this pattern of wealth-creation encourages rent-seeking as well as a tendency to live 
beyond one’s means’ (Karl 2007: 14). This is evident from looking at consumers’ borrowing 
behaviour; for example, by the end of 2008, the total amount of consumer credit was around 
KWD4,883 million, and the total government expenditure in that year was KWD17.7 billion 
(Al-Shall 2009a). Such expenditure trends are unsustainable, especially if we take into 
consideration that Kuwait has an established welfare system. Education is free, electricity is 
almost 80 per cent subsidized,
30
 and interest-free loans are given to all citizens to build their 
residences to the amount of approximately US$210,000.
31
 This is a reflection of the corruption 
Thomas Jefferson warned of, ‘when they [the heads of government] will purchase the voices 
of the people, and make them pay the price’ (Jefferson 1782). This endemic rent-seeking 
phenomenon is acting as a major obstacle to democratic development, and delaying the 
maturing of the current political system by ‘bribing’ society and buying its silence (Abdulla 
2010: 19–20). The executive branch is the catalyst of such a trend and historically has 
institutionalized such practices. The recent spread of legislation based on rent-seeking is a 
consequence of government policies rather than the cause of this phenomenon. 
These shortcomings lead us to believe that more structural changes are needed to ensure 
that future generations’ interests are preserved. Hence the second half of this paper will 
emphasise the need to incorporate a constitutional safeguard against rent-seeking and to 
introduce protection for future generations via a stakeholder-based definition of what 
constitutes public ownership. 
4. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR IN KUWAIT 
One of the objectives of constitutions is to avoid a Hobbesian state of nature and to design 
social cooperation (Farina 2005: 191–2). According to Hirschl, constitutional design ‘suggests 
that desirable social and political outcomes may be accomplished through optimal institutional 
planning and implementation. It often engages in a quest to find the best or most suitable 
constitutional rule’ (Hirschl 2009: 1339). In transitional societies such as that of Kuwait, the 
relationship between society and the state is complex. There is a struggle over state resources 
between tribes, religious groups, social classes and other interest groups (Ghabra 1997: 359). 
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 Kuwait’s consumption of electricity (with a population of 3.4 m) is greater than that of countries such as 
Ireland (population 4.5 m) and Denmark (population more than 5.5 m). 
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 For more details regarding the welfare system in Kuwait, see El-Katiri, Fattouh and Segal (2011).  
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This complex relationship is reflected in the Kuwaiti polity and the rent-seeking behaviour of 
the voters and interest groups as well as the royal family. 
The formation of the Kuwaiti Constitution was the result of collective decision and 
negotiation processes that involved a number of interest groups. These took place via the 
Constitutional Council, elected and formed of twenty members. This body then drafted the 
Constitution in 1961 (Abdul Reda 1991). The ministers in the Council of Ministers were ex 
officio members of the Constitutional Council, and they participated in the deliberations. Yet 
they did not vote, as the amir instructed them to abstain from voting on the final draft to 
ensure that only elected members voted on the Constitution. The royal family was the main 
interest group that had the most influence on the formation of the Constitution as well as the 
greatest stake, along with other groups such as the capitalist elite and the political liberal 
reformists.
32
 
According to Moe and Caldwell, 
in all democracies, the formal structures of the government arise out of politics, just as public 
policies do. There is no practical way of separating the two, for all political actors know that 
structure is the means by which policies are carried out or subverted, and that different 
structures can have enormously different consequences. As a result, there is inevitably a 
‘politics of structural choice’. (Moe and Caldwell 1994: 173) 
The reformist liberals and the royal family engaged in such behaviour during the drafting of 
the Kuwaiti Constitution, which led to the adoption of a hybrid political system.
33
 
The wording of the Constitution reflects this negotiation process, whereby the interests 
of the royal family as a participating group in the formation of the Constitution were amply 
acknowledged. For example, instead of the term ‘vote of no confidence in the prime minister’ 
we see that the words ‘difficulties of cooperation’ are used (Baaklini 1982: 364–5). Also, 
instead of stating that the amir has the power to ‘veto a law’, the founders of the Constitution 
adopted the phrase ‘to request the parliament to reconsider the proposed law’ as a sign that 
legislative powers rest with the National Assembly (Kuwaiti Constitution, Art. 66). Others 
consider that the adoption of such wording shows the desire to link the Constitution with the 
country’s Islamic heritage instead of merely reflecting Western doctrines (ibid.).34 However, 
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 Such as Dr Ahmed Al-Khatib; for more details of the social structure of the society at that time, see Ghabra 
(1997: 358–72). 
33
 See the Constitution formation treaties, as the Kuwaiti Constitution blended the presidential and parliamentary 
system. 
34
 This power is qualified, as the parliament can overcome the amir’s veto if two thirds of the members vote for 
the same law. 
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this cannot be evidenced when one examines the minutes of the Constitutional Council 
deliberations, as there is no reference to such a thing. The amir’s powers were qualified in the 
Constitution; for example, the National Assembly was to approve the appointment of the 
crown prince, the future amir of the country (Abdulmalek 2003: 311). 
Mbkau believes that, ‘after constitutional rules have been adopted and the apparatus of 
state established in a country, there exists an incentive for citizens to capture the government 
and use its redistributive powers to enrich themselves. Each political choice has a 
distributional effect, and participants in political markets have preferences about these effects 
and about public policy outcomes’ (Mbaku 1998: 196–7). As mentioned in section 2, the 
Kuwaiti Constitution’s failure explicitly to recognize political parties has led to an 
environment that has exacerbated rent-seeking behaviour. The recognition of political parties 
would reduce such behaviour, as political parties, through their organizational structure, 
increase the associated costs of engagement in this behaviour. For example, as a general rule, 
political parties tend to act as a unit; hence there is an internal negotiation and there are 
bargaining costs associated with any decision that needs to be adopted by the party. Also, the 
stakes of any political party are much higher than those of independent political agents. This 
eventually increases the costs of engaging in rent-seeking. 
The abundance of resources has led to a growing percentage of the population that 
would like to see a continuation and exploitation of the welfare state model that Kuwait has 
adopted since its independence, and further wealth distribution. Notable is, for instance, the 
rent-seeking behaviour of civil servants, who push the executive to increase their salaries 
regardless of the long-term effect on the productivity of the workforce or the sustainability of 
such rent-seeking behaviour – especially if we take into account that more than 90 per cent of 
Kuwaitis work in the public sector and represent a substantial portion of the voters.
35
 
According to Mbaku it is commonly known that ‘civil servants usually attempt to maximize 
their total compensation package through their influence on the political system’ (Mbaku 
1998: 195). In addition, when ‘the effective law of the land makes it difficult to take the 
property of others or to force others to pay for projects favoured by you and your interest 
group, rent-seeking is unattractive’ (Gwartney and Wagner 1988: 19). Rent-seeking costs for 
voters in Kuwait are almost zero because it is the property of future generations that is being 
exploited, and they are the ones that will pay for and suffer from such behaviour. 
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16 
 
A crucial matter pertaining to the effectiveness of a constitution is the provision 
thereby of constitutional backup safeguards for the enforcement of the constitution itself. 
According to Ginsburg and Elkins, ‘actors engaged in constitutional design may seek to adopt 
rules that will advantage them in post-constitutional politics’ (Ginsburg and Elkins 2009: 6). 
Similar trends can be found in the deliberations in the Constitutional Council when Sheikh 
Saed Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, son of the amir at that time, refused two of the amendments that 
Dr Ahmed Al-Khatib, one of the liberal reformists, had suggested, especially those that related 
to Article 80, which stipulates that ministers shall be considered to be ex officio members of 
the National Assembly. The rejection of Dr Al-Khatib’s proposal meant that the government 
can occupy up to one third of the National Assembly, with qualified authority especially in the 
case of interpellations, as the ministers are not entitled to vote in such situations. The 
insistence of the royal family on adding such an article to the Constitution was to ensure that 
they and the government would, in future, enjoy a major influence on the National Assembly 
and preserve some of their authority. 
 Ginsburg argues that 
a constitution that focuses on the public interest may generate insufficient political support at 
the phase of ordinary politics to withstand interest group pressures for modification … Thus 
constitutions require self-enforcement, and will endure so long as parties believe they are 
better off within the bargain than in risking new constitutional negotiations. The constitution 
becomes an equilibrium outcome. (Ginsburg 2010: 265) 
This required self-enforcement is absent in Kuwait as the main interest group, namely the 
royal family, who are supposed to be the self-enforcers of the Constitution, do not believe 
fully in the Constitution; indeed, history shows that they have made various attempts to defuse 
it.
36
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 In the early 1980s, a number of amendments to the Constitution were introduced to increase the powers of the 
royal family. For more details, see Lawson (1985), Al-Khatib (2009) and Yetiv (2002). The balance of power in 
Kuwait shifted in favour of the crown with the discovery of oil as the historically balanced relationship between 
the crown and the merchants (wealth holders) was distorted. The institutions that existed prior to the discovery of 
oil were mainly informal; no parliament or any other formal institutions existed in the year 1938. The discovery 
of oil empowered the crown, giving it absolute independence from Kuwaiti society. At the same time it eroded 
the independence of the merchants and the elite, as they became dependent on the crown. An interesting 
comparison can be drawn with the history of the monarchy in England, where the crown suffered from a number 
of setbacks such as the dethroning of Charles I and James II, which taught that the crown’s irrational behaviour 
would not necessarily be tolerated by the people. The fiscal deficit that the crown suffered from in the 
seventeenth century also contributed to a more balanced institutional relationship between crown and parliament. 
None of these or any similar events have occurred in post-independence Kuwait, with the exception of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which showed the crown the importance of enforcing and following the Constitution. 
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According to Ginsburg and Elkins, constitutional self-enforcing results from having an 
equilibrium [that] is enforced through groups in society policing transgressions. When a 
violation occurs, the subjects of the constitution face a severe coordination problem. They can 
take steps to uphold the terms of the constitution, but only if they can engage in collective 
action, which requires coordination among the individuals or groups that make up society. If 
they successfully resolve the coordination problem, the constitution is enforced, and it is 
possible that the ruler will refrain from transgression in anticipation of such enforcement. 
(Ginsburg and Elkins 2009: 10) 
The absence of dynamic civil society and official parties in Kuwait acts as a major obstacle in 
the case of any coordination efforts.
37
 
In any robust political system, informal safeguards against any hijacking of the official 
institutions – legislative and executive branches – exist.38 To be efficient, to be self-sustaining 
and to deter any undemocratic behaviour, backups depend on political participants who 
comply voluntarily with the constitution; otherwise they would defy the purpose of such 
systems (Gardner 2005: 294). The Constitutional Court is an example of such a ‘backup 
system’ that was embraced by the Kuwaiti Constitution to serve as a safeguard; however, it 
has mostly failed as a functional backup. For example, the Constitutional Court failed to 
examine the constitutionality of electoral law prior to the granting of women’s political rights. 
The reason for its failure is Law No. 14/1973, which established the Constitutional Court and 
its operating rules, as it severely limited public access to the Court. Consequently, the scope 
and the function of the Court were restricted.
39
 For comparison, historically in the USA the 
Pennsylvania Council of Censors that existed in the eighteenth century was a body in charge 
of reviewing every seven years to what extent the branches had followed the Constitution, and 
making recommendations accordingly. Having a similar institution on a formal basis is not 
something that is impossible; it can be formed but, to have more credibility and 
trustworthiness, it is preferable that such a function emerges from civil society rather than the 
state. 
Reforming the Constitutional Court would be a viable option, as Kuwaitis trust the 
judiciary. A survey conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found 
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 The Chadian experience in managing oil revenues is one that Kuwait can learn from. In Chad, civil society 
plays a major role in monitoring and supervising the use of these resources. This was brought about through the 
establishment in 1999 of a Monitoring Commission that overlooks the spending and impact of oil. See Alexander 
and Gilbert (2010: 38–40). 
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 For more details on self-sustaining constitutions and the role of democratic backup systems in the face of 
undemocratic behaviour, see Gardner (2005: 293).  
39
 For more detailed analysis of the Constitutional Court in Kuwait, see Abdulmalek (1986). 
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that around 80 per cent of the respondents believed that they would have a fair trial in Kuwait 
(UNDP 2009: 60). More recently the Constitutional Court has begun to play a major role in 
safeguarding the Constitution, especially when it comes to unconstitutional laws. For instance, 
in 2007 the Constitutional Court ruled that some of the provisions of Law No. 65/1979 are 
unconstitutional, as they breach the doctrine of freedom of gatherings that the Constitution 
protects (Kuwaiti Constitutional Court Decision, 1 May 2006). This 1979 law introduced a 
number of restraints on gatherings, as it required their prior approval by officials; otherwise 
the gathering would be considered in violation of the law. The Constitutional Court decision 
nullifying substantially the major part of the law was a milestone in the history of freedom in 
Kuwait. In this context the Constitutional Court can operate in an efficient manner and act as a 
true safeguard of liberties and constitutional doctrines. 
Civil societies play a pivotal role in Western states, as they monitor all formal 
institutions and, most importantly, counterbalance state power (Peerenboom 2003: 200). 
Despite the absence of a unified definition of civil society, an integral element of any ‘true’ 
civil society is its independence from the state. One of the main functions of civil societies is 
to act as informal gate-keeping ‘watchdogs’ over the state’s activities. This informal 
institution can be considered as part of the ‘backup systems’ or the second line of defence 
against constitutional hijacking. However, the paradox is that these institutions function within 
guarantees offered by the state; that is, their functioning is within the institutional setting that 
the state introduces, and these institutional guarantees are considered to be vital for the 
existence of civil society (Tushnet 2000: 380). Hence, if they cross the line, civil societies are 
threatened with retaliation from the government. This is exactly what happened in Kuwait in 
the late 1970s when the government, as a punishment for its political resistance, closed the 
Independence Society. 
Furthermore, parties that are not officially recognized hijack Kuwaiti civil society, and 
hence there is a major overlap between political societies and civil society activities (Fakhro 
2005: 3). This overlap is natural, as civil society institutions are expected to influence policy-
making in any given country. However, the separation is usually apparent between political 
parties and civil society institutions; that is, they are two different groups. In fact the situation 
in Kuwait is that political societies, due to the absence of a legal framework for their 
operations, ended up occupying civil society institutions and politicized their activities, as 
civil society acts as an operating platform for them. This resulted in an additional handicap on 
the operations and dynamism of Kuwaiti civil society. According to Fakhro, ‘Gulf 
19 
 
Cooperation Council states have not yet fulfilled the basic requirements that constitute civil 
society … [the] state has successes in transforming the civic society institutions to 
organizations performing as an extension to the state apparatus’ (2005: 6). 
The role of informal institutions such as customs, civil societies, social networks and 
religion cannot simply be excluded when one is assessing the institutional structure of any 
given country. According to Tocqueville, ‘without active participation on the part of the 
citizens in egalitarian institutions and civil association, as well as in politically relevant 
organizations, there will be no way to maintain the democratic character of the political 
culture or of social and political institutions’ (Tushnet 2000: 379). What Tocqueville is 
referring to are the informal institutions, ‘safeguards’, that are essential to complete the full 
picture of a democratic system that can function efficiently. 
In effect, the Diwanias are the only true independent civil society institutions in 
Kuwait. They are informal social gatherings that do not require any formal permission or 
application. They are truly free, and this is why we see that the Diwania was the only 
institution that performed a patriotic role as a political opposition to the government’s 
unconstitutional decision to dissolve the National Assembly in 1986 (Al-Mubaraki 2008). To a 
large extent, the Diwanias are similar to Western coffee houses in the seventeenth century as 
institutions that first emerged in civil society, according to Habermas. The main reason for the 
survival of the Diwanias is simple: they are places within the private property of individuals, 
and hence they are outside the domain of the state. In Kuwait, civil society institutions are 
regulated by Law No. 24, issued in 1962.
40
 According to this law, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs is responsible for monitoring and licensing these institutions and also for offering them 
state subsidies. So the government not only sets the institutional framework for civil society 
activities and operations, but offers subsidies and funding. Such an environment is simply 
undermining the role and independence of civil society institutions. This means that one of the 
main informal backup systems is barely functioning.
41
 
Can civil society play the same role in Kuwait as it does in the West? In liberal 
democracies, the state is considered to be a necessary evil and hence civil society is one of the 
mechanisms to balance and limit state power. Thus in order to answer the previous question it 
is crucial to ask: is the state considered to be a necessary evil in the Kuwaiti polity? In fact this 
may not be the case, as the state is playing a more paternalistic role, especially with its welfare 
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 Some civil society institutions have been politically active against state intervention and excessive use of state 
powers, e.g. the Kuwait Lawyers Association.  
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system. The absence of the conceptual notion that civil society needs to limit and counter the 
power of the state undermines the effectiveness of civil society as a safeguard in Kuwait. This 
is also evident in the literature concerning other rentier states in the region, where rent-seeking 
politics is widespread. For example, the National Center for Studies in Bahrain states that civil 
society institutions in the GCC serve as ‘intermediaries working between official government 
bodies and the family unit’ (Al-Alekri, Janahi and Hafith 2010: 5). Thus, the next section will 
argue that constitutional reforms are crucial in order to tackle the negative effects of rent-
seeking behaviours in Kuwait. 
5. RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
As has been illustrated above, the ongoing political dilemmas and institutional failures in 
Kuwait are reflected in its constitutional shortcomings in relation to, inter alia, the fact that it 
is a rentier state. In addition, the imbalance of power that the government enjoys especially in 
the economic and political arena has played a crucial role in its dysfunctional polity. 
 To date, instead, reform efforts have always been targeted at changing individuals and 
influencing the behaviour of political agents.
42
 However, these efforts continue to have their 
share of success and failure, with failure dominant. According to Al-Shall Weekly Economic 
Report, if Kuwait had a selection process that was transparent and based on qualifications and 
suitability, things would be solved for the decision makers and a brighter future would be 
guaranteed for the country (Al-Shall 2009c). However, this will never happen, and even if it 
did then it would only be temporary, as history proves. 
This continuous failure is simply due to a systematic failure in the rules of the game, 
rather than the failure of individuals. It is rooted in the structural setting in Kuwait. Recall that 
Wicksell as early as 1896 ‘called attention to the significance of the rules within which 
choices are made by political agents, and he recognized that efforts at reform must be directed 
toward changes in the rules for making decisions rather than toward modifying expected 
results through influence on the behaviour of the actors’ (Van den Hauwe 1999: 611). This is 
exactly what Kuwait currently requires: raising the level of effort from requests to change 
certain individuals such as the current prime minister to changing the rules of the game. It is 
no longer optional; it is a matter that goes to the heart of the evolution of the current quasi-
democratic system. 
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 For example, in 2009 a campaign was implemented against the former prime minister Sheikh Nasser Al-
Mohammed Al-Sabah. In the past there was a civil society campaign to separate the posts of crown prince and 
prime minister, as historically the same person used to occupy both positions.  
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Certainly, these structural changes face a number of obstacles, which, as illustrated in 
this paper, include the fact that Kuwait is a rentier state and the spread of rent-seeking 
behaviour. Not only will such reforms improve Kuwait’s democracy and sustainable 
development; they are also backed by strong arguments relating to intergenerational equity 
and the legal concept of property. According to Coase, ‘positive transaction costs may cause 
the bargaining performed by individuals in their social interactions to result in an inefficient 
outcome’ (Farina 2005: 187). The situation in the Kuwaiti political environment now can only 
be one of ‘high transaction costs’, especially when it comes to any proposed reforms that need 
a constitutional amendment. In legal and economic terms, this means that the positive 
transaction costs, according to Coase’s theorem, act as an obstacle to any constitutional 
reform.
43
 
 
In other words, uncertainty over the actions of the other party, mainly the crown as a 
major player in the Kuwaiti political structure, makes it too costly to explore such an option 
due to all the uncertainties that can emerge from pursuing it. Hence, the great majority of the 
opposition and political activists refuse to explore constitutional reform as an available option 
despite the fact that they are convinced that it is needed (Al-Talea 2006).
 
Nonetheless, the 
current political tension is pushing the opposition to demand explicitly constitutional checks 
and especially a popular government, but these have yet to happen. 
A second obstacle that hinders any real reform proposals is the rentier nature of the 
Kuwaiti economy. According to Heckman, ‘the political economy of the welfare state is 
rigged against reform because so many persons are its beneficiaries. Reforms that have 
occurred in most states have been quite modest … there is little internal capacity for 
democratic societies to reform themselves without a crisis’ (Heckman 2008: 99). Kuwait is no 
exception to this rule; as long as oil prices continue to rise, the hope for any structural reform 
is limited. According to Karl, ‘Petroleum creates a world of illusion because some people 
become wealthy without effort’ (Karl 2004: 665). 
Day after day, the number of beneficiaries of the welfare state model based on rent-
seeking increase, gradually killing the civic spirit of the society. The legislative and executive 
branches continue to feed this process. For example, the legislative branch recently passed 
Law No. 37/2010, which stipulated that no industry can be privatized unless the new private 
sector owner accepts all the employees that used to work in the public sector and ensures that 
none of their financial benefits are affected for five years. To an extent, this is understandable 
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in order to minimize the social impact of privatization. However, the law does not stop here; 
rather, it stipulates that after the five years have lapsed, any such employee whose job in the 
private sector is going to be terminated shall be guaranteed a job in the government with the 
same financial benefits (Kuwaiti Law No. 37/2010, Art. 20). Without the introduction of this 
clause, the law would not have passed through the National Assembly. 
Furthermore, the absence of an established taxation system is an obstacle facing any 
reform initiative (Losman 2010: 429–30). Unlike tax-paying societies, where the citizenry 
funds initiatives through taxes, when the Kuwaiti political establishment makes a political 
decision that requires funding it simply pays for it with oil revenue, which results in eroding 
activism among citizen. In tax-paying societies, individuals can engage in collective efforts to 
change the decision-making regime through the ballot box. In other words, in a functioning 
democracy, society pays directly for political decisions through taxation, which is a kind of 
safeguard.
44
 Voting democracies can also change the political establishment through their 
votes. In Kuwait, where the citizenry pays no taxes, only the National Assembly is elected by 
the people while the executive branch is appointed by the amir. Therefore, the society cannot 
simply choose another prime minister if it is not satisfied with the current one. This is why 
recently, and for the first time in Kuwait’s modern history, demands for a popular government 
became very vocal and were at the top of the opposition agenda. 
It is argued here that a major factor that can shield any country from the natural 
resources curse is the quality of its institutions, and constitutions play a major role in shaping 
this (Boschini, Pettersson and Roine 2003: 1). This will minimize, not eliminate, rent-seeking 
behaviour and encourage good governance. As was shown throughout this paper, Kuwait is 
affected by being a rentier state and by widespread rent-seeking behaviour. Recall that rent-
seeking implies that actions taken by individuals and groups alter public policy in order to 
gain personal advantage at the expense of others. In fact, ‘the expense of others’ needs to be 
liberally interpreted to capture other stakeholders, mainly future generations, in a rentier 
economy, due to the nature of such an economy’s resources. Society in a rentier economy 
should be considered as a trustee of natural resources and, hence, institutions should be 
established to govern the society’s ability to use current resources. 
This is a problematic situation as it clashes with mainstream notions of state 
sovereignty in political science and law, because it is not common to restrict a society’s 
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capacity to decide its own destiny and make local choices. Such a restriction on society’s 
freedom to do whatever it desires with its natural resources, even if it were done 
democratically, should be an integral part of the checks and balances on any rentier economy 
through its constitution. Germany, for instance, has ‘pioneered constitutionally anchored “debt 
brakes” making it illegal for governments to pile up debts that burden future generations – 
though also limit the freedom of action of current policymakers’ (Atkins 2011). This approach 
is what the Kuwaiti Constitution is really missing, and with the proposal set out in this paper it 
is hoped that a similar institution will be introduced in Kuwait. 
One can apply to the political status quo in Kuwait the theory of contractual 
incompleteness, which states that contracts are imperfect as it is impossible to include all 
future contingencies in the drafting process.
45
 After all, a constitution is the result of a 
bargaining process that is analogous to that involved in drafting contracts. The founders of the 
Kuwaiti Constitution introduced checks and balances over the amir’s political powers as an 
attempt to establish a more balanced political system.
46 However, the current Kuwaiti 
Constitution is far from perfect, especially if we take into account the fact that Kuwait is a 
rentier state and hence requires special institutions and approaches that would not usually be 
found in other states. The rest of this section will aim to outline a number of reforms that 
would result in introducing the necessary institutions that are unique to the nature of the polity 
and economy in Kuwait, in order to limit the evils that emerge from its being a rentier state 
and from rent-seeking. 
The role and responsibilities of states in a rentier economy need to be revisited and the 
state role needs to be reshaped due to its unique economic system. The notion of directors’ 
fiduciary duty in UK company law offers an ideal structure for the role and responsibilities of 
governments in a rentier economy. The objective behind this exercise is to lay the ground for a 
new legal definition of public ownership of natural resources, as an attempt to establish an 
additional safeguard for the Kuwaiti government and to curb the current widespread of rent-
seeking behaviour that is eroding democratic institutions. Under UK company law, directors 
owe their fiduciary duty to the company rather than to the shareholders (Ferran 1999: 154–5). 
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This is an interesting approach, as one can ask: why is it not to the shareholders? After all, 
they are the ones that have injected capital into the company and actually formed the 
company. And is there really a difference between the shareholders and the company that 
justifies such a distinction? These are all valid questions, which I shall explore in this section 
before drawing out the similarities and differences between a corporation and the political 
structure of a state. 
The distinction that UK company law introduced between the interests of the 
shareholders and those of the company is insightful. In Percival vs. Wright, the House of 
Lords decided that directors owe their fiduciary duty to the company rather than to individual 
shareholders (UK High Court, Percival vs. Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421). In addition, the courts 
have decided that a company includes present as well as future shareholders. This is an 
interesting analysis of what constitutes a company. Such an approach can be applied to a 
rentier state setting by equating future generations with future shareholders. 
I am proposing that the fiduciary duty of the political bodies under the Kuwaiti 
Constitution be extended to include sustainability and the interests of future generations, 
especially when it comes to the expropriation of natural resources. One might argue that this is 
already implicit in the notion of public interest. Moreover, one might argue that this proposal 
stands contrary to Article 6 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, which stipulates that ‘the System of 
Government in Kuwait shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides in the people, the 
source of all powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner specified in this 
Constitution.’ By limiting the authority of both the National Assembly and the executive 
branch, it might be argued that we are undermining the will of the people. However, this is not 
true, for one clear reason: the Constitution is already full of provisions that aim at protecting 
fundamental rights such as those of free speech and academic freedom, and these rights 
supersede the legislative authority of the National Assembly and the executive power of the 
government (Kuwaiti Constitution, Arts. 30–49). 
A further objective of this reform is that if such a restriction were introduced with the 
presence of an active and well-established Constitutional Court, then that might advance the 
longstanding plan to diversify the economy by limiting the use of natural resources as the 
major source of funding for the state, and create a positive environment for democratic 
evolution. This could force the state to engage in real economic and political reform activities. 
Introducing a new definition of ownership of natural resources to the political bodies in 
Kuwait would mean that many of the rent-seeking laws that both the government and the 
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National Assembly are championing could be challenged, on the basis that they are 
unconstitutional because they are against the interests of future generations and undermine the 
sustainability of the economic system. As a result of minimizing rent-seeking behaviour, the 
corrupting impact of these practices would be reduced and the quality of political institutions 
enhanced, by shifting their focus from continuous encouragement of rent-seeking behaviours 
to more productive activities that would contribute to the evolution of the political 
environment in Kuwait. In addition, society activism would increase, as currently rent-seeking 
behaviour is essentially discouraging a great portion of society from engaging in any proper 
evaluation of these political bodies. 
According to Lehavi, property rights, which are political institutions, have three main 
characteristics. First, they are the result of ‘conscious decisions by the state’ (Lehavi 2008: 
1993). Second, the state is not merely a private coordinating institution; rather, it plays a major 
role in creating and developing property rights regimes. Finally, since the state as an 
institution is not simply a private coordinator, its decisions need to be based on different 
grounds from those that are applicable in private markets (ibid.: 1994–5). Public reasoning in 
this case becomes integral to the process of creating property rights regimes. Adopting this 
approach means that there is no ‘single or formal’ structure of property regimes; rather, it is 
the structure that the state chooses to have in the light of public reasoning, adding in any 
values or goals that are desired (ibid.: 1998). In the words of Lehavi, property is ‘understood 
as a jurisprudential framework the primary purpose of which is to delineate basic kinds of 
entitlements and obligations in regard to certain types of resources’ (ibid.: 2004). This means 
that the notion of property rights is something that can be reshaped according to economic, 
social, political and even ethical or philosophical interactions. All of this depends heavily on 
the environment that exists at the time that these rights are formed and/or redefined. 
The property right in natural resources presents true economic, political and ethical 
dilemmas in rentier states. For instance, transforming it into public ownership ensures, to an 
extent, that any appropriation will be within the political system of the state, and if it is one 
that is democratic, or quasi-democratic like the one in Kuwait, this means that it will ensure 
that the great majority would benefit from it. Public ownership of natural resources is 
currently the trend globally as, according to Groves, ‘[it is a] nearly universal principle that oil 
… [is] the property of the State and is to be managed by the State for the benefit of its 
citizens’ (Groves 2005: 83). For instance, can the current generation decide, even 
unanimously, to extract all the oil,
 
sell it, and distribute the proceeds to the current citizens? 
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Under the current legal definition of public property, it is possible, but is it ethical, or, even 
more, does the current society have the right to do so? 
The reason for proposing a new legal definition for public property ownership of 
natural resources is the fact that such ownership now lacks an important legal element, namely 
any consideration paid by the current generation to justify ownership. What was the 
consideration in legal terms that the current society paid in return for claiming absolute 
ownership over such a natural resource? The answer is: nothing. It was a mere stroke of luck 
that a given country ended up having such a reservoir of natural resources. Hence, rentier 
states’ ownership of natural resources is akin to the position of a trustee rather than full legal 
ownership. 
The proposed redefinition of a natural resources legal ownership framework, which 
introduces a stakeholder matrix as the model for such ownership, is not unusual or unheard of 
in constitutional law. For example, the US Constitution imposes certain limitations on the use 
of natural resources.
47
 Also, this proposed alteration of the legal framework would be similar 
to the current development in the US courts in reference to the doctrine of standing, where the 
courts have expanded the definition of constitutional standing beyond economic injury to 
include environmental and other non-economic injuries (May 2009: 140). This proposed 
reform would add an additional safeguard on governments, provided that there is, to an extent, 
an independent judiciary. It would also force the government to deal with these resources 
reasonably and push for the real economic diversification that everyone is discussing, but 
about which so little has been done (Al-Shall 2010b). 
In sum, the main advantage of the proposed alteration of the legal framework for 
natural resources is that it would allow individuals to challenge any act by the government 
and/or National Assembly that would violate the individuals’ interests or those of future 
generations, on the grounds that the government and/or National Assembly are not entitled to 
utilize natural resources without taking into consideration the interests of all stakeholders, 
including those of future generations. This would be the case provided that the other proposed 
reforms in this paper were incorporated, mainly the introduction of political parties and 
reforming the Constitutional Court to give access to individuals to petition the court directly, 
as has been done by many countries, such as Switzerland and Spain. 
                                                          
47
 The majority of these restrictions relate to commerce clauses etc. For more details on this topic, see May 
(2009).  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to introduce an institutional analysis of the current political 
impasse in Kuwait. The spread of rent-seeking behaviour and the absence of a self-
enforcement environment for the Kuwaiti Constitution are acting as two major obstacles to the 
evolution of the Kuwaiti polity. The transitional phase that Kuwait is in currently is being 
prolonged by a number of institutional shortcomings in the state structure. These include the 
absence of legally recognized political parties and the dominance of the executive branch over 
the National Assembly, as a result of the institutional framework that was introduced by the 
1962 Constitution. A fair political structure and a true balance of power are missing in Kuwait. 
The Constitution is not operating in a politically sustainable environment. According to 
Hamilton, ‘Whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must 
altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the 
government’ (Hamilton 1788). 
This paper identified how reforming and reinvigorating a dynamic set of ‘safeguards’ 
in the Kuwaiti polity, such as a constitutional court, and the introduction of a new public 
ownership legal definition, based on stakeholding in natural resources, could have a positive 
impact on the evolution of the political framework in Kuwait. The proposed legal ownership 
of natural resources would help in reducing existing rent-seeking behaviour by introducing 
new limits on the use of natural resources. Moreover, it would reduce the rentier impact of the 
current institutional setting by giving official legal recognition of future generations, along 
with extending the fiduciary duty of the legislative and executive branches to include the 
interests of future generations. Therefore, this would , inter alia, contribute to solving the 
current political impasse. 
Finally, the paper identified a number of obstacles facing the reform agendas in 
Kuwait. These obstacles are exacerbated by the death of civil society as a catalyst of any real 
reform and by the spread of rent-seeking behaviour, which is sowing the seeds of self-
destruction within the society. In other words, the spread of rentier ideology is mutilating 
political institutions in Kuwait.
48
 After all, democracies are not the result of declarations or  
  
                                                          
48
 I use Douglass North’s definition of ideology as ‘the subjective perceptions that people have about what the 
world is like and what it ought to be; ideology therefore affects people’s perceptions about the fairness or justice 
of the institutions of a political economic system’ (North 1988: 15).  
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constitutions only, as Judge Learned Hand stated: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, and 
upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts 
of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no 
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no 
constitution, no law, no court to save it. (Hand 1952: 99–100) 
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